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ABSTRACT
Community and democratic participation are still an essential component
of current mainstream development interventions. However, elite capture
seriously undermines the outcomes of development projects. This article
analyses the effects on (in)equality of the implementation of policies that are
technically participatory, in the context of an internationally-funded urban
development programme inNairobi, whichwas implemented in the aftermath
of the post-election violence of 2007–2008. Ethnographic data reveal how
the institutionalization of pre-existing power imbalances between landlords
and tenants is accomplished through the creation of structures of commu-
nity governance and ‘participatory enumeration’. The article concludes that
without the resources to challenge powerful interests within the settlement,
the programme is likely to worsen the condition of a large section of the
residents. In the context of strong pre-existing inequalities and conflict, par-
ticipation needs careful management and firm external agency to achieve
genuine social transformation.
INTRODUCTION
Community and democratic participation remain essential components of
mainstream development interventions. Development agencies need com-
munity partners in order to implement their programmes, and therefore
‘build’ communities and their governance structures. In Nairobi, infor-
mal settlements host heterogeneous and fragmented residents who are
socially divided into two main groups: landlords and tenants. Focusing
on an internationally-funded urban development programme, this article
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analyses the effects on (in)equality of the implementation of policies that
are technically participatory.
Much research in the area of urban development studies has shown how
state-driven regeneration programmes have resulted in displacement and
gentrification (Bassett et al., 2003; Campbell, 1990). In contrast, other stud-
ies have shown how communities self-organize to demand public services,
and have praised the collective action of disadvantaged urban communities
in pursuit of their own development (Appadurai, 2001; D’Cruz et al., 2009;
Mitlin, 2008; Weru, 2004). Despite their different approaches and conclu-
sions, these two bodies of work share an exploration of the relationships
between ‘the state’ (or other development agencies) and ‘communities’.
However, contributors to this debate seldom problematize the community
itself, despite the fact that it is widely acknowledged in the literature that
slums are some of the most unequal settlements in the world.
Scholars have long observed the marginality of poor urban tenants, their
relationship with landlords, and their exclusion from local organizations
(Amis, 1984; Gilbert and Varley, 1990; Nelson, 1979; Rakodi, 1995b).
Research has shown how community leaders in low-income urban areas do
not represent all residents and how the interests of women are frequently
ignored (Ward and Chant, 1987). There is also significant work exploring
the diversity of livelihood strategies among slum dwellers (Beall, 2002;
Rakodi, 1995a; Rakodi and Lloyd-Jones, 2002). More interestingly, some
recent work (Dill, 2009; Lemanski, 2008; de Wit and Berner, 2009; Ze´rah,
2009) has analysed the impact of residents’ social organization and internal
community dynamics on participatory projects in urban areas. However,
there is still insufficient micro-level analysis of these internal community
processes in relation to slum-upgrading outcomes. There is, of course, much
significant work questioning the notion of community in development at
a more general level (e.g. Mohan and Stokke, 2000), and with regard to
rural participatory projects in particular (e.g. Chhotray, 2004; Mosse, 2001;
Platteau, 2004). This article draws on the latter literature to examine how
pre-existing inequalities affect the implementation (and, by implication,
outcome) of an urban development programme embedded in a ‘participa-
tory’ framework. It looks inside the ‘black box’ of ‘community’, in order to
analyse, firstly, the process whereby structures of community governance
are created and, secondly, the manner in which ‘participatory enumeration’1
is carried out in one slum-upgrading programme. It also explores how the
wider political climate — specifically post-election violence — as well as
limited government capacity affect the way participation is managed.
After a selective review of the relevant literature on the concept and
practice of ‘community participation’ and ‘elite capture’, this article will in-
troduce the history, context and social organization of the settlement under
1. A census administered door-to-door to identify the residents of a certain area. This is a key
process in identifying the beneficiaries of slum-upgrading interventions.
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study. A brief presentation of the programme and the actors involved is fol-
lowed by an ethnographic account of the process through which structures
of community governance were created and ‘participatory enumeration’ was
carried out. These accounts provide the basis for analysing the progressive
process of exclusion of certain sections of residents, and for a critical exam-
ination of the impact of pre-existing social inequality on the participatory
project.2
COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN CURRENT DEVELOPMENT
DISCOURSES AND PRACTICES
In the 1980s, the failure of large-scale, state-driven and top-down approaches
— which ignored the priorities and needs of the poor — opened a debate on
participatory development with the idea of ‘putting the last first’ in the plan-
ning of development interventions (Chambers, 1983). The key idea was to
learn from the poor, and to understand the complexity of their social reality
in order to design more appropriate programmes together with the beneficia-
ries. The concept of participation entered mainstream development, defining
what became critically termed a ‘new orthodoxy’ in the 1990s (Gardner and
Lewis, 1996). ‘Participation’ remains at the heart of development discourses
and practices today.
With the passage of time, an increasing body of work started to show how
these participatory approaches and techniques could easily turn into another
form of domination (Woost, 1997). According to Mosse (2005: 96), these
techniques have become rituals to transform people into beneficiaries of de-
velopment interventions. Moreover, participatory projects have unwittingly
built upon pre-existing power structures, reinforcing them (Chhotray, 2004;
Mosse, 2005) to the advantage of the ‘learning elites’ (Wilson, 2006). These
learning elites are formed by local people who have learnt how to man-
age the discourse of participation and its language, and are able to exploit
these skills to gain (or maintain) privileged access to development resources.
They present themselves as representatives of the community, and become
intermediaries between project officials and beneficiaries. Therefore, sev-
eral studies have argued that participatory projects are vulnerable to ‘elite
capture’ (Platteau, 2004) and create parallel structures that detract from the
democratic process and public scrutiny (Green, 2000, 2002: 67).
A common argument is that in communities with ‘serious power imbal-
ances . . . the poor are heavily dependent on vertical links with local elites,
2. This article draws on published analyses of slums and slum-upgrading in Kenya; official
documents and reports from the Kwa-maji Urban Development Project; formal and informal
interviews; and sixteen months of fieldwork, which involved participant observation in
several important events connected to the programme, aswell as participation in the everyday
life of the settlement and the implementation of the programme.
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[therefore] it is difficult to form the horizontal associations necessary for or-
ganising collective action for the common good’ (DasGupta et al., 2004: 28).
When collective action does take place, elites strongly oppose it or capture
the benefits (Bardhan andMookherjee, 2000). In very unequal communities,
‘the “elite capture” problem becomes more acute’ (Abraham and Platteau,
2004: 229). Ze´rah corroborates this point by arguing that ‘class remains
a relevant category in understanding participation as a terrain of struggle’
(2009: 859)— an important argument for the analysis of the slum-upgrading
project set out here.
Another problematic aspect of participatory approaches is their often-
idealized view of harmonious ‘natural’ communities, a view which suffers
from a lack of understanding of power structures (Guijt and Shah, 1998;
Mohan and Stokke, 2000; Mosse, 2001) and of how community represen-
tatives may also be motivated by individual interests rather than the good
of the collective (White, 1996). Participation is the outcome of a politi-
cal process influenced by participants’ inequalities in resources and power
(Mayoux, 1995: 245). These misunderstandings regarding communities and
personal incentives have meant that participatory projects may serve to en-
trench rather than reduce inequalities. As a result, their capacity to achieve
more efficient and equitable results than their top-down predecessors is still
seriously questioned (Dill, 2009).
THE KWA-MAJI URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT AND THE POLICY
CONTEXT
The first two years (2008–2010) of the Kwa-maji Urban Development
Project (KUDP)3 were aimed at improving the living conditions of Kwa-
maji residents through the provision of security of tenure and the building
3. Kwa-maji is a pseudonym and the names of the key actors have been anonymized. This
choice was made for multiple reasons. Many institutional actors were represented by a
limited number of staff who would be easily recognizable if I were to mention the actors
and the settlement. This would violate research ethical guidelines as it would threaten
the anonymity that I committed to grant to my informers and interviewees. Moreover, the
programme deals with one of the most problematic political issues in Kenya: the distribution
of land. This issue generated conflict, and two community leaders had already been violently
killed; the second murder in particular reinforced my conviction of the need for unequivocal
anonymity. At the same time, the programme is ongoing, and the research itself could
create internal conflicts among the actors or, even worse, be used by competing government
departments in future election campaigns. Moreover, there is a risk that misuse of the
research, extrapolating parts out of their context, could be used to attack the professional
reputation of implementing staff and institutions. These risks are very concrete. While
many other researchers have anonymized their work (e.g. Platteau, 2004), sometimes even
concealing the country (Rossi, 2004), without having affected the relevance of the argument,
I amaware of the limits that such a level of anonymity implies, particularly around facilitating
debate and comparative work.
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of infrastructure, with an emphasis on participation and inclusion. This first
phase of the KUDP was funded by an OECD donor (hereafter known as
AID) as part of its most important bilateral initiative with the Government of
Kenya (GoK). Initially, AID wanted a United Nations organization (UNX),
considered expert and neutral, to be the main implementing body of the
programme. However, the GoK wanted to maintain a prominent role itself
and AID agreed to have a GoK Department (hereafter the Lead Government
Agency), as the principal implementing body, thus significantly reducing the
role of UNX. While the GoK, through a different department, had an estab-
lished collaboration with the United Nations in the field of slum-upgrading,
AID did not itself have any previous experience of slum-upgrading in the
region, but nevertheless wanted to use this pilot programme to develop an
approach that was possible to replicate elsewhere.
Slum-upgrading in Kenya and particularly in Nairobi has a long history.
Starting in the 1970s, the response to informal settlements was the introduc-
tion of ‘site and services’ schemes. These schemes were supposed to relocate
slum dwellers to different areas and provide them with basic urban services
such as roads, water and electricity. They also provided finance for housing
construction that would often be started by the project, and completed by the
beneficiaries. These projects succeeded in partially addressing the demand
for housing; however, they generally failed to consult target groups in the
planning process, and were also criticized for corruption in allocation pro-
cedures (Syagga et al., 2001). Many programmes were conceived according
to middle-class standards and were not economically sustainable for the tar-
get group, leading to ‘gentrification’ (Campbell, 1990; Syagga et al., 2001).
This process has been widely described by Mitullah (1992) in the case study
of the Umoja Tenant Purchase Scheme; Huchzermeyer (2008) in relation
to the Kibera High Rise project of the early 1990s; and Ochieng (2007)
in Pumwani, among other examples. In line with international policies, the
GoK has also recognized that, together with their residents, slums can be up-
graded in situ, and has tried out different approaches, exploring diverse types
of tenure (Bassett and Jacobs, 1997). An important feature of this new gen-
eration of programmes has been the emphasis on community participation
that has become a central pillar of mainstream development practice.4
It was in this policy context that the KUDP officially started in the spring
of 2008. This was in the aftermath of the worst violence that Kenya had
seen since independence, generated by the general election of December
2007. This violence claimed more than 1,100 victims and resulted in over
350,000 people being internally displaced, some even within Kwa-maji.
The first priority of the Kenyan government officials, when called on to
implement the programme with limited resources, was therefore to avoid
any further violence. In other words, there was a conscious need to ensure
4. For a detailed review of Nairobi slum-upgrading programmes and the policy landscape, see
Omenya and Huchzermeyer (2006).
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that this project did not create additional conflict that the government was not
prepared to deal with, and that would have been unacceptable to the donor.
This was no easy objective to achieve, considering that the programme
intended to allocate land — arguably the most delicate political issue in
Kenya (Ndungu, 2004; Southall, 2005) — and at the same time, to limit
government intervention and foster a community-led process.
HISTORY AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF KWA-MAJI
Kwa-maji was created in the 1970s as a settlement for people who had been
evicted from slums closer to the centre of Nairobi. The growth of the slum
was enabled by temporary licences distributed to occupants on purely sub-
jective criteria. The allocation of plots to new settlers was managed through
these licences by a committee composed of the area Chief,5 his assistants,
local elders and local representatives of the KANU party (which governed
from independence until 2002). Possessors of these licences then built struc-
tures which they rented out to newcomers arriving from rural areas. Since
that time, an informal market in structures has emerged, which makes it
possible for new, affluent people to buy and own structures. The allocation of
plots was oftenmade along ethnic lines, thus creating systems of political pa-
tronage. Since the first evictions in 1977, resettlement in Kwa-maji favoured
the Kikuyus, who still own the majority of structures in the settlement.
The creation of a committee of elders by the local Chief to assist in local
administration is normal practice in Kenya, dating back to colonial times.
In Kwa-maji, the influence of the elders was such that one of the villages
(the settlement is composed of eight smaller neighbourhoods called villages)
was originally named after a prominent elder on the allocation committee.
From the outset, village committees, working closely with the Chief, dealt
with housing problems, village administration and the settlement of disputes.
They also controlled the informal market in structures (buildings).
This process created the main, and lasting, social division in the settle-
ment — that between tenants and structure owners. This kind of social
division has characterized Nairobi slums for a long time: at the beginning of
the 1980s, Amis (1984) found an already well-developed system of informal
ownership and landlord–tenant relations. In the 1990s, there was a huge
campaign to rename this category ‘structure owners’, and not landlords as
they were previously known. This was done in part to clarify that they did
not own the land, as well as being part of an attempt to push an agenda of
tenants’ rights (Huchzermeyer, 2008; Syagga et al., 2001). In a recent article,
5. In Kenya, the area Chief is an appointed representative of the central government in a
certain location; he/she has many powers, and can implement his/her decisions through the
administrative police under his/her command.
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Gulyani et al. (2012: 252) demonstrate that living conditions for tenants in
Nairobi are considerably worse than for structure owners.
In 2000, President Moi promised to give the Kwa-maji land owned by the
government to its residents. A powerful group of structure owners, formal-
ized into an ‘association of structure owners’, immediately mobilized and
went to court to claim the land. The same year, other residents — including
some structure owners — started to work with an NGO to undertake an enu-
meration of structures and residents in the settlement, with a view to planning
a process of slum-upgrading. In 2001, somemembers of the communitywere
even flown to India in order to learn from other slum communities.
Even though this enumeration was only an initial step and had no direct
implications for the allocation of land, structure owners felt threatened by
the process and used every available means to stop it. The enumerators had
to be protected by the police while they performed their duties. The planning
of the slum-upgrading came to a halt shortly after the end of the enumeration
when the government withdrew its support because of a court case against
government institutions, filed by the structure owners’ association.
Since the first multi-party elections in 1992, episodes of ethnic violence
appeared in Kwa-maji, often around election times. The clashes were mainly
between the two main tribes: Kikuyu and Luo. Similar clashes followed the
2007 elections, and in one village — which is part of Kwa-maji but not
included in the project area since its land is private — Luo tenants expelled
their structure owners and refused to pay rent. Structure owners in the other
villages became worried that their position could be undermined.
Today, while the land in Kwa-maji belongs to the government, the struc-
tures belong to 4,300 structure owners, over half of them living outside
Kwa-maji. According to the figures from the enumeration carried out by the
programme in 2010 (these figures are problematic in themselves, see below),
there are 34,000 residents in Kwa-maji. Of these, 19 per cent are households
of resident structure owners and 81 per cent are tenants’ households. These
figures exclude the 2,300 absentee structure owners who own 55 per cent of
Kwa-maji structures.
This short account shows that Kwa-maji was a conflict-ridden settle-
ment with an already-consolidated social structure and organization in place,
and previous contested experience of slum-upgrading. Social organization
was mainly built around patterns of property ownership, shaped historically
through patronage politics and ethnicity. Ethnic tensions around elections
were connected with national politics but also influenced by local patterns
of property ownership.
THE COMMUNITY ELECTIONS OF 2008
With its emphasis on democratic community participation, it was necessary
for the KUDP to establish legitimate representatives of Kwa-maji, both
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in order to deal with government officials in the implementation of the
programme, and to secure community support. The KUDP therefore set
about organizing the election of a Residents’ Committee.
A first stage in this process was a two-day listening survey (June 2008) that
asked people who the opinion leaders were in the community, among other
things. Names were collected and these people were subsequently invited
for an opinion leaders’ sensitization workshop, attended by forty-two people
(July 2008). Thisworkshop drewup themethodology for elections, including
the key aspect of the composition of the Committee. The official report of
the workshop states that, ‘the Residents’ Committee should comprise six
community representatives from each of the seven villages:6 two structure
owners, one tenant, one woman, one youth and one elder’ (KUDP, 2008a:
7). Crucially to the eventual outcome, there was no further elaboration of
how these categories would be interpreted.
Barazas (public meetings) were then held in each of the villages, where,
in the words of the official report on the Committee elections, ‘the structure
owners met and agreed to collectively support the programme’ (KUDP,
2008b: 3, italics added). In one subsequent baraza, the District Officer
announced that the elections would take place at the beginning of August.
Prior to this date, therewas an information campaign, involving street posters
and mobile loudspeaker announcements from the programme vehicle. As
regards the actual voting process in August 2008, the government report
states: ‘The voter turnout for the Residents’ Committee election was high,
with some villages recording several hundreds of people who had turned out
in readiness for the exercise’ (KUDP, 2008b: 19).
The outcome of this process was that the KUDP now had its own forty-
eight-member Residents’ Committee. The elected leaders were given train-
ing and became the conduit between the government and the ‘community’.
During the Leadership Training Workshop that took place ten days after the
Committee was elected, a government official explained that the Committee
would have important functions relating to the key issue of land allocation.
These included ‘definition and identification of the target groups and
beneficiaries; coordinating verification of the lists of beneficiaries; selection
of development and planning options, including land tenure’ (KUDP, 2008c:
6–7).
The first, and most basic, point to make about these elections is that the
composition of the Committee itself was socially unbalanced: a minority
(structure owners) were assigned twice as many representatives as the ma-
jority (tenants). This makes it hard to sustain the argument that this process
was in essence democratic. A second point of criticism is that the voting
method chosen was the mlolongo vote,7 whereby voters line up in front of
6. Initially two villages were considered one by the programme.
7. The national election held in 1988 introduced the mlolongo system (Swahili word for
queuing). In 1992, the multi-party elections saw a return to the secret ballot.
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their favoured candidate. According to the government election report, the
mlolongo was preferred because a secret ballot ‘would require too much
time and resources, and was more open to abuse’ (KUDP, 2008b: 4). How-
ever, as emerged from my ethnography and as recognized in the KUDP’s
own Concept Paper, ‘The tenants have no tenure security, as the structure
owners enjoy the right to evict for non-payment of rents or any other reason’
(KUDP, 2008d: 4). Therefore, it is likely that many tenants voted for their
structure owners out of fear of eviction, or as a way of reinforcing their client
relationship with their structure owners. In addition, themlolongomethod of
queuing, without even registering voters, and the confusion regarding guide-
lines, facilitated the ‘importation of voters’, whereby candidates would bring
people from nearby villages to queue in front of them.8 The lack of clear
guidelines and the lack of an extended effort to build political awareness
within each different interest group led to the paradox that, at least in one
case, even the tenants’ representative came from a structure owner’s family,
as noted in the official election report (KUDP, 2008b).
The whole process led to a Residents’ Committee dominated by struc-
ture owners. This could probably have been predicted in advance from the
Committee composition agreed during the initial sensitization workshop.
However, the results turned out to be even more unbalanced than this com-
positionwould imply, since in some villages, the representative ‘woman’ and
‘elder’ elected were also structure owners. In this way, it was possible that
four or even five out of the six positions assigned to each of the eight villages
could be occupied by structure owners. I calculate that between thirty-two
and forty of the forty-eight members were themselves structure owners.9
The widespread official narrative that voter turnout was high also needs
further scrutiny. The visual image of long queues in front of candidates
was taken as evidence of high turnout. However, the report on the elections
estimates that only around 3,500 to 4,000 people voted, which must be
deemed a very low turnout, even if one accepts the (also very low) total
figure of 34,000 residents arrived at by the programme’s enumeration (see
below).
Even after the elections, there was an ongoing process of establishing a
strong power-block of structure owners inside the Residents’ Committee. At
the Leadership Training Workshop already mentioned, an Executive Res-
idents’ Committee was elected from the overall forty-eight members. The
government report on this workshop states that after discussions, the follow-
ing composition of the Executive Residents’ Committee was proposed and
8. Importation of voters was a problem acknowledged in the official report on the election
(KUDP, 2008b: 19).
9. This was a very sensitive issue to discuss; however, my calculations were confirmed by
various community members, including a local missionary who raised the issue in a meeting
with the government, ‘In the Residents’ Committee more than 60, maybe even 70 . . . 80
per cent are structure owners’.
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elected: eight structure owners, two tenants and a youth. The area Chief, a
city council officer and the area councillor were included as ex officiomem-
bers (KUDP, 2008c). Clearly, this further skewed the already-unbalanced
representation in favour of structure owners.
THE PARTICIPATORY ENUMERATION OF 2010
Having in this way established a community governance structure and hav-
ing started on some infrastructural work,10 the next decisive step of the pro-
gramme was to carry out a ‘participatory enumeration’, in effect a detailed
census of all residents which would identify project beneficiaries. Whatever
the political choice in relation to land allocation, a properly conducted enu-
meration is necessary in any slum-upgrading programme. It is normally a
preliminary step, but inKwa-maji, due to the sensitivity of the exercise, it was
postponed for a long time. Of course, as UN-Habitat has pointed out, an enu-
meration is never a neutral exercise.Well carried out, it can be used to rectify
existing inequalities. A carefully implemented participatory enumeration can
counter ‘the actions of powerful eliteswithin a settlement’; and ‘marginalised
groups (women, tenants . . . ) can be included in the upgrading and devel-
opment processes that follow’ (UN-Habitat, 2010: 8). On the other hand,
if such an enumeration is conducted in a superficial manner, it can ‘favour
only particular groups or classes of residents, at the exclusion and expense
of others’ (ibid.: 118). Indeed, enumerations can be said to generate conflict
because they expose to public scrutiny pre-existing inequalities in resource
allocation and relationships between tenants and landlords (ibid.: 140).
An enumeration is normally a comprehensive and costly exercise, but if
vigilantly implemented can provide all the information needed to plan a slum
upgrading. Types of data and accuracy differ in every enumeration depending
on the purpose for which they are collected (UN-Habitat, 2010). In some
cases, the aim may be simply to ascertain the total number of residents. In
others, and this was the case inKwa-maji, complete accuracy is of the highest
importance, since the enumeration would be used to identify beneficiaries
of the programme. In such cases, any mistakes would have the serious
consequence of excluding potential beneficiaries from the programme.
In Kwa-maji, the process of data collection constituting the enumeration
was divided into three different research projects — the numbering of struc-
tures, a socio-economic survey, and the enumeration of residents. Prior to the
first of these, the Lead Government Agency carried out a physical mapping
of the whole area. It then assigned a number to every structure, identifying
its owner/s by name, and connecting it to the GIS (Geographic Information
10. An office for the Residents’ Committee, a footbridge, and water tanks in every village were
the initial infrastructure improvements. The construction of the main road was underway
and the construction of a dispensary was at a planning stage.
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System). It is important to the analysis here that this exercise identified only
the structure owners.
When that had been completed, UNX commissioned a local research
consultancy to carry out a socio-economic study (October–December 2009)
based on a random sample of 540 households. Before the household survey
began, its contents were carefully examined by the Residents’ Committee
in an ad hoc workshop with the consultants. At this stage, the Committee
managed to eliminate the collection of any data they deemed controversial,
in particular regarding the relationship between structure owners and tenants.
The Residents’ Committee cleverly argued that collecting such data would
generate conflict and further division in the community. It is significant that
neither the Lead Government Agency nor UNX had any objection to these
simplifications, since they accepted at face value this threat of conflict or
‘community resistance’ to the research.
It was eventually established that long-term residents were also to be in-
cluded among the beneficiaries of the programme, and that therefore a full
enumeration of residents was needed. At this point, the Residents’ Commit-
tee gave their consent to the enumeration on the condition that it was imple-
mented, under their control, by the Lead Government Agency. As explained
at the beginning of this article, UNX had lost its role as main implementer
of the programme; nevertheless it still held responsibility for the politically
delicate enumeration. However, the top leaders of the Residents’ Committee
insisted that UNX was not seen in positive terms by the community, and
persuaded the Steering Committee of the KUDP to reassign the sensitive
exercise to the Lead Government Agency. The Residents’ Committee had
viewed UNX with suspicion from the start because the United Nations was
implementing another major slum-upgrading programme in neighbouring
Kibera with a policy of redistribution of assets. After receiving compen-
sation (still under negotiation), structure owners were to be equated with
tenants, both being beneficiaries on equal terms.
While enumerations are generally admitted to be costly (UN-Habitat,
2010), the Kwa-maji enumeration was conducted with a budget of only 1.2
million Kenyan shillings (11,000 euro), about 0.5 per cent of the project
budget. The team of enumerators was made up of one government officer
who was in charge of two members of the Residents’ Committee and one
to three female enumerators recruited from new university graduates. The
enumerator would call at the door of the dwelling and ask for the ID and
voting card of the person. The enumeration form was then filled in with
both parties standing outside the door of the dwelling. This was carried out
on weekdays between 10.30 am and 3 pm, a time when many people are
away from their homes.11 When no one was found in a dwelling, neighbours
11. Other NGOworkers who had conducted household surveys, as well as academic researchers,
were keen to explain how they needed to work at night or weekends in order to find people
at home.
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were approached for information; however, inmost cases neighbours refused
to provide information on others. Moreover, no documentary details were
obtained of people who were absent on the day of enumeration. At one point,
I was able to ask the enumerators what they would do to get information
about those who were absent. The team leader answered: ‘We told people
about the enumeration and we are trying our best, but we know that if we
are enumerating 10,000 people we have maybe an error of 500’. I stressed
the fact that mistakes in an enumeration interested in knowing the total
number of people were not that important, but when inclusion in the list of
beneficiaries was the aim of the exercise, accuracy was fundamental, and
people could not be excluded just because theywere away at work. I received
the answer, ‘It is unfortunate for them’. I then asked whether people would
have the chance to come and register themselves at a later stage, such as one
of ‘public data verification’ (as advised by best practices); but I was told that
it was not in the plan at that time.
Enumeration forms used by other organizations in analogous circum-
stances all had a length of about eight pages per household. However, in
Kwa-maji the form was drastically simplified to just one page per structure.
Given that most structures consist of eight rooms, each one occupied by a
‘household’, it must be concluded that the enumeration in Kwa-maji was
designed to collect up to sixty-four times less information than a standard
enumeration undertaken for similar purposes. In general it can be said that
the more data are collected on residents, including all the tenants and their
families, the greater the chance of recognizing them as project beneficiaries
with specific needs. However, in this case, this specific information was not
collected. Moreover, the enumeration form was too simple to record the
distinction between a room that was vacant and a room where the residents
were out at work. Therefore, even if the will had been there to improve the
data by returning to those residents who had been out when the enumerators
called, it would have been impossible to know which forms were in need of
such completion.
The intention was to record the names and document numbers of the heads
of household in the case of each room in the dwelling. However, as I myself
witnessed, many structure owners told their tenants to tell the enumerators
that the owner was living with them. Since tenants had no clear idea of how
the data would be used, some of them acceded to this request. As the form
only had space for one name, the enumerator had then to put the name of
the structure owner as head of household and delete the name of the tenant.
In this way, many tenants, without knowing it, lost any chance of being
included as a beneficiary of the project. Structure owners, on the other hand,
wanted to be registered as residents because they knew that in other slum-
upgrading programmes, absentee structure owners were not benefitted in an
equivalent way to those resident in the settlements.
No verification inside the house was made, and it was not possible to know
whether the person at the door was the resident, or a relative of the structure
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owner purposely sent to enact the role of resident and get registered instead
of the tenant. Simple checks recommended by international best practice to
avoid such errors were dismissed as unnecessary by the Lead Government
Agency, on the grounds that the Residents’ Committee was supervising the
process. This represented a failure to consider how this committee was itself
a concrete expression of the structure owners and their interests.
There is also an important issue of gender: when the only name reported
on the enumeration is the head of household, this is almost always given as
the man, if a couple is living in the household. This problem has been widely
noted elsewhere, but the result in this case was particularly problematic,
since it meant that many womenwere not recorded as potential beneficiaries.
Only their male partners would be listed and this, in the context of dynamic
and unstable relationships that characterize Nairobi slums (Flores Fernandez
and Calas, 2011: 133), renders women even more dependent. For instance,
if a woman leaves a violent husband she will not benefit from the slum-
upgrading. This is yet another case to add to the literature that shows how
household surveys may end up worsening women’s situations (Kandiyoti,
1999).
INSTITUTIONALIZING PRE-EXISTING INEQUALITIES
The following analysis of this ethnographic account explores the relation-
ship between ‘participation’ and ‘elite capture’; it is divided into five sub-
sections, each of which deals with one aspect of the process which served to
institutionalize a pre-existing inequality. The first section looks at how the
perceived need to avoid further conflict led the parties to adopt a pragmatic
alliance with the structure owners as ‘representatives’ of the community.
The second addresses barriers to participation in the project process, partic-
ularly as regards gender. The third looks specifically at how capture by an
elite worked to exclude those who had originally been intended as the ‘target
group’ of the participatory programme. The fourth examines discourses of
community and their relation to heterogeneity and political divisions among
structure owners in Kwa-maji. The final subsection looks at how it was that
policies designed to avoid ‘elite capture’ were not followed in this case.
Avoiding Conflict
The Residents’ Committee elections took place just after general elections
had led to the most severe political crisis of independent Kenya, a crisis
which claimed many lives, some within the programme area. This clearly
explains the government’s concern with avoiding violence in the Kwa-maji
elections. From this perspective, the election exercise was very successful
— disregarding for the moment at what cost this was achieved. Moreover, a
Residents’ Committee dominated by structure owners— those with strength
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and power in the community — had advantages in terms of the effective
implementation of the programme. Conflict was avoided by supporting and
promoting those whose capacity to generate conflict had caused the failure
of a similar upgrading programme in 2001.
Up until now, I have used the words ‘elite’ and ‘structure owners’ as
loosely interchangeable. However, the group that became dominant in the
Residents’ Committee has multiple identities, and its members are hard
to define with a single term. They are almost always structure owners.
Property ownership is considered a prerequisite for joining the elite group
because, as explained by an experienced development worker, ‘when you
own something you have an interest in the area, you are a shareholder of
[Kwa-maji], and therefore you have the legitimacy to participate in the
decision-making process’. They are also normally considered wazee, elders,
which does not necessarily mean that they are ‘old’; wazee is more a title
of reverence. It means that they are called on to settle personal matters and
small conflicts, or to help the Chief in doing so. They are also gatekeepers,
who manage the access of external actors wanting to operate in Kwa-maji,
and are also considered to be community representatives, legitimated and
formalized in this role by the elections.
Years of dealing with community issues means that many residents are
connected to this elite through relations of patronage. The loyalty of peo-
ple towards their patrons allows the latter to mobilize the residents easily
and make them comply with project implementation (Platteau, 2004). In
this case, no other actor could so successfully manage residents’ consent.
The publicly visible voting system contributed to the reproduction of these
relations of patronage. Many residents themselves, after seeing the disaster
of national elections conducted through secret ballot, genuinely considered
queuing in front of the candidates amore transparent way to display alliances
and loyalties within Kwa-maji. To this extent, the Residents’ Committee was
a success in reconciling conflicting policy needs of the project, since it could
be officially considered a democratic and legitimate form of community rep-
resentation, while still maintaining pre-existing power relations unchanged.
Both the GoK and AID needed to achieve their objectives. One can sur-
mise that they pushed towards the easier route: the alternative of dealing with
the conflict more openly could have destroyed the entire process at its incep-
tion, with the structure owners boycotting the upgrading, as had happened
in 2001. Mosse’s (1997) work is particularly instructive in demonstrat-
ing that participatory and community-driven development is not possible
without the transformation of the social equilibrium through which elites
have maintained control over the management of resources. Challenging
this equilibrium necessitates a slow and gradual process and requires a full
understanding of the political and social dynamics. In the current case, the
KUDP seems to have taken a decision to avoid disturbing the existing so-
cial equilibrium, even though it is clear that in order to genuinely achieve
full participation and social inclusion, a very different and more conflictual
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intervention would have been necessary. In addition, an intervention that
challenged the status quo could not have been undertaken in a short space
of time.
Barriers to Participation
An important issue, severely underestimated by the KUDP but widely ac-
knowledged in the literature, is that in order to be able to participate, it
is necessary to remove minimum barriers for vulnerable groups; partici-
pation is costly (Corbridge et al., 2005: 149; Mansuri and Rao, 2004: 6).
Mayoux (1995) argues that this has an important gender dimension, since
the resources required, especially skills and time, lead to inequality in op-
portunities for participation. Lack of formal education, or of mobility to
attend meetings, frequently put women at a disadvantage when it comes
to participating. Moreover, participatory programmes require considerable
amounts of time, and the resultant higher ‘opportunity costs’ also work to
the disadvantage of women (ibid.: 246–8).
In Kwa-maji, involvement in public meetings and community governance
structures requires a substantial time input, as well as a minimum level
of education in order to understand the process and be able to participate
meaningfully. In female-headed households, women cannot afford to leave
their daily work in order to participate as this would imply a direct loss of
livelihood. During the Leadership Training Workshop, it was specified that
members ‘should be committed and available for intensive involvement.
Frequent meetings, sometimes on short notice; should be ready to work
on voluntary basis — no pay’ (KUDP, 2008c: 7). Only those who do not
need to engage in paid work can afford these conditions: in this context,
this means primarily the structure owners, who gain income from their rent
revenues. Recent research undertaken in the informal settlements of Dar es
Salaam (Hooper and Ortolano, 2012) similarly shows that property owners
were more likely than tenants to actively participate in risky and time-
consuming community initiatives, whereas the advocates of those initiatives
had expected higher participation among tenants. Hooper and Ortolano also
found the division between structure owners and tenants to be the most
important in explaining different patterns of participation (ibid.: 112).
In Kwa-maji, the selection of community leaders included a general criter-
ion regarding ‘levels of education’: this, too, operated to discourage tenants
(who are among the poorer people in Kenya and have a lower level of for-
mal education) fromputting themselves forward for the ExecutiveResidents’
Committee or other official positions. Moreover, for the most disadvantaged
residents to begin to publicly express their social and economic needs would
imply taking up a position against powerful groups. As Corbridge et al.
point out (2005: 252) the disadvantaged will think carefully before making
requests that would challenge an important patron, since they have realistic
assumptions on the long-term character of power structures. In this regard,
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Crook (2003: 86) argues that ‘popular perceptions of the logic of patronage
politics’ reinforce ‘elite capture of local power structures’. In their detailed
review of practices of participation, Mansuri and Rao (2004) emphasize
that, along with material barriers, there are psychological obstacles to par-
ticipation. In line with Mayoux’s (1995) conclusions in relation to India,
Nicaragua and Kenya, we find that in Kwa-maji, the most vulnerable and
marginalized people need government or NGO actors to be fully cognisant
of their interests and to give extra support to their participation through, for
instance, affirmative action strategies. As Das Gupta et al. (2004: 32) put it,
empowering the urban poor requires ‘considerable political commitment on
the part of the state, to overcome landlord resistance as well as tenants’ fears
of retribution from landlords’.
Elite Capture and Participation: Excluding the Target Group
Analyses of participation elsewhere have exposed how participatory projects
are often built upon pre-existing oppressive power structures (Cooke and
Kothari, 2001; Mosse, 2005), particularly if there is no will to challenge
the existing social equilibrium (Mosse, 1997). What is interesting in Kwa-
maji is how community participation, planned through the construction of
local governance structures in order to facilitate the implementation of the
upgrading, has further empowered dominant elites.
Right from the start, the programme’s strategy of democratic community
participation was paving the way for the future handover of the management
and implementation of the slum-upgrading programme to the community.
In practice, this meant handing over to the Residents’ Committee; in order
to enable this, the Committee was registered as a non-profit corporate body
and a formal constitution was drawn up. This formalization process fostered
the notion among the structure owners that, since they were effectively in
control of these local governance structures, they would eventually become
the legitimate owners of both the land and the developments of Kwa-maji.
Platteau (2004) has argued that in rural community-driven projects, ‘elite
capture’ does not prevent the project benefitting everyone in the commu-
nity. In such cases, elites who deal with development agencies and attract
funding tend to appropriate a much larger share of the benefits of projects.
Nevertheless, the projects will generally improve the situation of the wider
community and the latter will often be thankful to the elite for bringing in the
project. Olowu (2003: 46) argues that local elites have ‘resources, knowl-
edge, influence and networks’ and are therefore crucial to local governance
structures, but should not be allowed to exclude the poor. He concludes that
institutional frameworks should be designed in order to involve elites but,
at the same time, to prevent them from exploiting the structures of local
governance for private interests. This is difficult given that when access to
external funds is limited to a small elite, the bargaining strength of non-elite
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groups is very limited and the latter are obliged to accept highly unequal
patterns of distribution in terms of project benefits (Abraham and Platteau,
2004: 226).12 On the other hand, Dasgupta and Beard (2007) argue that even
in the context of ‘elite capture’, projects may continue to benefit the poor.
In their urban case studies, local elites were willing and able to contribute
the time and know-how needed to facilitate community-level projects and
governance.
In the case of Kwa-maji, elite capture is more worrying than in some
other development contexts. Here it is not a matter of simply excluding
some people from the benefits of the project; rather, the programme has the
potential to lead to the complete disruption of the lives and livelihoods of rel-
evant sections of the population. This is because, in urban slum-upgrading,
what is at stake is the very land on which people live. In Kwa-maji, the
elected committee had to decide who would be entitled to receive land and
how. The Residents’ Committee was called on to make important political
choices that would affect all residents, but without itself being constitution-
ally representative of these different groups. The Committee had to address a
number of key questions. Should the project give land only to structure own-
ers? Should land allocation include or exclude absentee structure owners?
Should the project give land to tenants who had resided in Kwa-maji for over
ten years? If so, what would become of the other tenants (at least 45 per cent
of the residents and probably more) who would then be displaced? Would
tenants who were not granted land rights be able to afford rent, once houses
are improved and the area fully serviced? Besides these formal choices, the
degree of control vested in the Residents’ Committee allowed it to shape
the outcome of activities such as the enumeration, even though that had
originally been designed to bring other interest groups into the programme.
All in all, the ‘participatory’ process gave the structure owners access to
areas of decision making and influence that extended their existing power
in new directions. As argued by Conning and Kevane (2002: 389), social
exclusion is ‘deeply rooted in local social divisions and the way the commu-
nity operates and regulates access to resources. Changing these structures
and breaking down social divisions often requires challenging established
structures and mobilizing the disadvantaged’. They conclude that, rather
than letting ‘the community’ choose rules and criteria to obtain programme
benefits, ‘carefully chosen national targeting rules, criteria and national po-
litical support can help strengthen the position of disadvantaged groups in
these local contests’ (ibid.).
Following Dasgupta and Beard (2007), it is certainly important to recog-
nize that local elites not only possess know-how but also enjoy community
recognition which may facilitate the implementation of community projects.
12. Abraham and Platteau (2004) argue that the situation is similar to an ultimatum game. If the
elite withdraw their support, the project will not take place. Therefore, the elite have strong
leverage because without them the rest of the people will not obtain any benefit.
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These authors argue that elites may also be willing and able to contribute
their time and play a key leadership role. Therefore, they argue, it is use-
ful to distinguish between elite control over the project and elite capture
of the benefits (ibid.: 244). In complex contexts, local power structures of
patronage may be utilized productively in projects. However, these elites
may exploit their power to shape the project to their advantage. In these
circumstances, the state has the duty to ensure that the prominent role of
the elites in the project does not undermine the stakes of the other residents.
The role of state implementers may actually be to ensure that the local ex-
pertise of elites is used productively and not at the expense of the poor. A
project may not be able to dismantle consolidated social structures — and
there are also good reasons for projects not to aim at revolutionizing the
existing social order — but at the same time the state should ensure that the
poor are not excluded from interventions that are likely to radically change
their lives. These findings support Werlin’s (1999) argument for a strong
state administration of slum-upgrading projects.
Discourses of ‘Community’ and Internal Heterogeneity
It would be incorrect to argue that the implementers of the project were not
aware of conflicts and differences in interests among the residents. However,
their assumption was that, following the election process, legitimate leaders
would emerge and would express the will of ‘the community’. Negotiations
would take place among the elected leaders, and the three top represen-
tatives, who had the right to sit on the Steering Committee, would bring
community issues to the attention of the implementers. From the perspective
of programme officers on the ground, to challenge choices made by commu-
nity leaders would have been tantamount to a betrayal of the participatory
process. It would also have implicated them in the adoption of a patronizing
attitude towards the community, rather than viewing it as a partner.
In the discourse of the programme, what these leaders said was what the
community said. They became the voice of the community. This discourse
had important effects; an interesting example was what happened with the
enumeration. Programme officials argued that in this case there was no need
for the checks and balances normally employed to prevent abuses, because
the community, through their leaders, was directly involved (my italics).
The notion of ‘community’ was thus invoked in such a way as to conceal
oppressive power relations within that same ‘community’ (Guijt and Shah,
1998; Mohan and Stokke, 2000).
Another example of the deployment of this discourse occurred when the
leaders of the Residents’ Committee said in the Steering Committee that
the community did not trust UNX and did not want UNX to undertake the
enumeration. There was no questioning of who within the community did
not want UNX. The task was simply reassigned to the Lead Government
Agency of the GoK, and UNX was requested to transfer the money they had
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received for this activity to the Lead Government Agency. This discourse
was so strong that it allowed the obfuscation of the clear political reality
that for the structure owners, a UN body that in other programmes had
been assiduous in recognizing tenants’ rights represented a threat, and was
certainly less easy to influence than the Lead Government Agency.
However, while there is no doubt about the structure owners’ dominance
over theResidents’Committee, structure ownerswere also a very fragmented
category. Some of them refused to take part in project activities at all, and
remained faithful to the structure owners’ association that had blocked the
previous slum-upgrading attempt in 2001, despite its eventual court defeat.
These structure owners continued to boycott the project, raising a stream of
allegations against the Residents’ Committee and the implementers. Even
among the structure owners elected to the Residents’ Committee, conflicts
emerged. For instance, one prominent member, together with the area Chief,
was managing a community hall rented out to development agencies and
community groups for meetings. Other Committee members reclaimed the
community hall and brought it back under the control of the Residents’ Com-
mittee, so cutting off one source of income for the Chief and the committee
member. Other splits arose around the divide between absentee and resident
structure owners. Internal divisions such as these have actually opened up
a space for more balanced decisions in the Residents’ Committee. For in-
stance, some structure owners have come to recognize that tenants with over
ten years’ residency in Kwa-maji have a more legitimate claim to land than
do absentee structure owners. This group of structure owners has been using
this claim in furthering their own struggle against absentee structure owners.
Learning Elites Capturing the Programme
UN-Habitat clearly recognizes the problems I am analysing here. Its own
publication, entitled ‘CountMe In: Surveying for Tenure Security andUrban
Land Management’, and produced in Nairobi, states that in enumerations it
is difficult to ensure representation of vulnerable groups, and that ‘there is a
danger that the results may solidify an already unequal distribution of rights,
assets and access to resources’ (UN-Habitat, 2010: 141). To avoid this risk,
the document argues that it is important to conduct the enumeration carefully.
However, in the case of Kwa-maji, the implementation would seem to have
been careless rather than careful. The research tool was oversimplified,
contributing to the dumbing down of the entire exercise. The survey was
conducted in a hurry, during the central hours of the day, and without
verifying individual households by entering the dwellings. The results were
startlingly out of line with previous quantitative estimates, but, remarkably,
no one questioned them. The initial project documents had mentioned a total
population of 100,000–120,000 in Kwa-maji. This figure is widely thought
to be an exaggeration, but the figure of 34,000 arrived at by the enumeration
is likely to have seriously underestimated the tenant population.
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The Kwa-maji socio-economic study, commissioned by UNX and imple-
mented just a few months before the enumeration, states that the population
inside the settlement had continued to grow in the last ten years. The enumer-
ation conducted in 2001 had identified 18,537 households, while the new
enumeration found only 10,581 households. Surprisingly, this huge dis-
crepancy did not provoke any reaction. Had the Lead Government Agency
wanted to understand how 8,000 households had disappeared over a ten-year
period, while their own socio-economic study argues that population had in-
creased in that same period, they might have asked the NGO that conducted
the previous enumeration for their dataset. This never happened, despite the
fact that the dataset was offered to them. Whenever I personally raised any
doubts, the response was always that the Residents’ Committee — hence
the community — had supervised the process and therefore it must have
been fair and correct: had there been irregularities, people would have raised
their voices. It is not only the possibility of quantitative errors in the data
collection (and therefore mistakes in the total number of residents) that is
significant here, but also, as indicated above, the limited and poor quality of
information collected regarding tenants. Even if tenants had been included
in the total number of residents, the scant availability of data may still have
worked to exclude them in practice in subsequent phases of the project.
It cannot be argued, either, that the elite in Kwa-maji were unaware of
the political nature and ramifications of an enumeration in the context of
slum-upgrading. Some elite members of the Residents’ Committee, who had
been involved in the previous slum-upgrading programme, had at that time
travelled to India with the aim of learning from other enumerations and slum-
upgrading approaches. They were therefore fully aware of the potentially
empowering effects of enumerations to challenge the status quo; it was in
full knowledge of this potential that they acted to transform the exercise
in their favour. In this they were supported by a government interested in
finishing the exercise quickly and without generating any conflict with the
local elite that was their main partner in the settlement. The instrument
for the socio-economic survey was simplified each time a discussion was
held about its content, and the same thing happened subsequently with the
enumeration form. Again, the discourse of the presence of ‘community
leaders representing the interests of all residents’ was used to justify a
certain level of laxity in relation to these vital processes. This lack of care
was undoubtedly also tolerated because of the desire to finish what was
turning out to be a tiring and under-funded exercise as quickly as possible.
The actual enumeration was carried out by young, female graduates on
short-term contracts, with little likelihood of renewal. They therefore had
little incentive to do the job well, and simply followed instructions given to
them by community members. They certainly did not have the social power
or the will to challenge or further verify the information given to them. In
sum, we can say that the exclusion of marginalized groups in Kwa-maji
was accomplished socially through a series of small, bureaucratic omissions
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and approximations in compiling the forms. At the same time, Residents’
Committee members ensured that those who were closely connected to them
were accurately enumerated.
Years of development interventions in Kwa-maji, in particular the pre-
vious slum-upgrading attempt, had allowed the structure-owning elite to
learn about slum-upgrading processes, such as how enumerations are imple-
mented and what they imply. They had become what Wilson (2006) calls
‘learning elites’. As a result, they managed to capture the local governance
structure offered by the current programme, and later successfully contained
the effects of a potentially emancipatory participatory enumeration. They
prevented UNX from conducting the enumeration by managing the lan-
guage of participation. The elite argued that the community did not trust an
external actor and were then pleased with the Kenyan Government Depart-
ment which, they said, the community trusted. This confirms the findings of
Mansuri and Rao (2004), namely that participatory projects ‘create effective
community infrastructure’ but ‘[m]ost such projects are dominated by elites,
and both targeting and project quality tend to be markedly worse in more
unequal communities’ (ibid.: 1).
An influential body of work argues that these community infrastructures
initiated by participatory projects have indeed created new spaceswhich have
the potential to empower people and generate transformative social change
(Cornwall, 2002; Cornwall and Coelho, 2006; Hickey and Mohan, 2004).
These authors argue that whether such spaces were claimed by the people
or created by invitation by the state or other development actors, they may
provide people with the opportunity to speak and negotiate with government
officials for the first time. Such participatory spaces may be provided in
order to facilitate compliance and control over beneficiaries but, as Williams
(2004: 557) puts it, the consequences of participation ‘are not predetermined
and its subjects are never completely controlled’. This article does not deny
that participation may indeed open new empowering spaces but it poses the
important question, ‘for whom?’. The analysis of the Kwa-maji case study
has clearly shown how new spaces have empowered primarily the local elite
of structure owners.13
CONCLUSIONS
Patronage relationships at local level are considered a constant feature of
African politics, and not one which can be addressed by one development
programme (Platteau, 2004). However, when elites capture a programme
13. The analysis of subsequent project activities revealed that such participatory spaces also
opened up some limited avenues for contestation of the Residents’ Committee, which had to
reassert its legitimacy by delivering some visible developments in Kwa-maji. Challenging
Kwa-maji’s elite was also possible due to their internal conflicts (see above).
278 Andrea Rigon
involving land distribution and gain legitimacy as key decision makers with
regard to land allocation, the likely outcomes include not only the exclusion
of some beneficiaries from their fair share of the benefits: there is also a
serious risk that the programme will exacerbate previous inequalities, with
potentially disastrous results for the poorest. For instance, if the land is
given to a minority of the residents and the state provides infrastructure and
services as well as facilitating housing improvement, rents will increase and
most tenants will not be able to afford to live there.
In Kwa-maji, the Lead Government Agency feared that confronting the
structure owners would result in a much more time-consuming and con-
flictual process, and this in the immediate aftermath of post-election ethnic
violence that had destabilized the country. Such an undertaking would have
required a very intensive use of resources and would have been difficult to
justify to other actors, not least to the international donor, who wanted to see
community consensus.
Participation is not only costly for beneficiaries but also for implementers.
In order to ensure that marginalized categories (tenants, single mothers,
and so on) contribute to decision making in a participatory programme, the
government needs to act consistently and firmly, and has to be able to chal-
lenge powerful local groups. As argued by Das Gupta et al. (2004: 28), in
communities characterized by severe power imbalances, ‘higher levels of
government may actually be better placed to help the disadvantaged’ than
local actors with vested interests. One of the paradoxes and criticisms of
participatory practice in general is that whilst it emerged out of a widely-felt
need for a power reversal between development agencies and beneficiaries
(Chambers, 1983), it nevertheless relies on some external agency to organize
participation. This has led many critics to argue that participatory processes
are shaped by outsiders (Cooke and Kothari, 2001;Mosse, 2005). The lesson
from Kwa-maji is that a stronger display of power from the ‘outsiders’ —
government and development agencies — is required in the management of
participation. Reducing poor people’s dependence on the local elite ‘takes
much more careful design and effort’, with greater effort required in more
unequal contexts (Das Gupta et al., 2004: 29). Engaging communities re-
quires ‘careful planning and active management’ (ibid.: 48). Participation
cannot be naively considered to be an entirely people-driven process where
external agency is interpreted as a failure to achieve ‘genuine’ participation.
Participation must be managed carefully if a programme involving land dis-
tribution is to avoid ‘elite capture’ and the worsening of the living conditions
of a significant share of the target group. As several authors (Abraham and
Platteau, 2000, 2004; Das Gupta et al., 2004; Tendler, 2000) have argued,
there are severe risks in quickly devolving power to communities. Such pro-
cesses require attentive management and careful social analysis of the target
community.
Careful management of participation implies tackling powerful interests
which, as mentioned above, requires various resources that may not be
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available in every context. In Kwa-maji, this was difficult for a number of
reasons, amongst which the wider political situation figured prominently,
particularly the national post-election violence. However, additional causes
included the failure of the previous upgrading project, and a history of resis-
tance and violent reaction from local structure owners, which contributed to
the government prioritizing the need to avoid further violence. The govern-
ment implementers also lacked legitimacy, a key resource needed to tackle
powerful interests. There was no political support for a process which might
create conflict in the informal settlements in the aftermath of what could have
potentially become a disastrous civil war. The project had limited financial
resources, and the donor was unwilling to invest in such a risky undertak-
ing. Moreover, while in other contexts the state may have the legitimacy
to use its power to manage development processes, implementers in Kwa-
maji lacked this legitimacy in the community. In Nairobi slums, the state is
largely absent as a service provider and it is perceived by residents only in
its repressive and brutal dimension, particularly as the main perpetrator of
evictions and demolitions. The post-election violence further delegitimized
the state. Under these conditions, implementers found the support of the
local elite very valuable and aimed at establishing a mutually beneficial
alliance.
When discourses of community participation are coupled with limited
resources to deal with power imbalances within communities, the likely
result is elite capture. In such cases, ‘participation’may become, as Rahnema
(1992: 119) critically argued, a tool for saving money by passing on some of
the costs of development to the poor. Participation can save costs associated
with ensuring community compliance and collaboration; however, as we
have argued, if ‘participation’ is to avoid failure with regard to its pro-poor
objectives, then it is anything but cheap. An important conclusion of this
study is that, in the context of pervasive and entrenched inequalities, it may
not be possible to initiate a transformative process of social change without
creating conflict. Thus, resources to deal with such conflict are needed — a
conclusion consistent with the findings of Mansuri and Rao’s (2013) review
of participatory projects.
The case study presented here forces us to question the viability of
community-driven ‘participatory’ slum-upgrading projects in the context of
conflicts which the implementers do not have the resources to deal with. To
implement the project under these conditions means that it may end up, like
most of its predecessors in Nairobi, benefitting groups with a higher income
instead of the intended beneficiaries (Syagga et al., 2001). This sombre con-
clusion echoes the predictions of economists that, given the social conditions
in Nairobi’s slums, standard slum-upgrading approaches based on provision
of infrastructure and security of tenure are likely to benefit structure owners
rather than the poorest residents (Gulyani and Talukdar, 2008). What this
article has shown is how this prediction is allowed to come true, despite
the lessons from other, similar cases. Understanding these social processes,
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both at the local level and as they play out in relation to government and
international partners, is a necessary precondition if upgrading projects are
to achieve more genuine social transformations in future.
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